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John G. Browning 
Keep Your “Friends” Close and Your Enemies Closer: 
Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the Use of Social Media 
Abstract.  “When All That Twitters Is Not Told; Ethical 
Considerations in the Use of Social Media” 
This Article will examine the ethical issues posed by lawyers’ use of 
social media platforms in light of the ABA Ethics Commission 20/20 
changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Social networking 
has had a transformative effect both on the way society shares information 
and on the legal profession.  Much of the discussion to date focuses on the 
discovery and use of evidence from social media sites in criminal cases and 
civil litigation, but attention must also be directed to the ethical quandaries 
posed by the legal profession’s use of social media.   
This Article will consider issues such as the duty to provide competent 
representation in the digital age; the trend of requiring lawyers, as a matter 
of professional competence, to be up-to-date on the use and implications 
of social media; and maintaining client confidentiality in the age of 
Facebook and Twitter.  It will also discuss ethical risks that can arise from 
fact gathering and preservation of evidence in the social media context.   
Author.  Partner with Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP in Dallas, 
Texas.  J.D., University of Texas School of Law.  B.A., Rutgers University 
(Rutgers College).  Author, The Lawyer’s Guide to Social Networking: 
Understanding Social Media’s Impact on the Law (West 2010). 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
The advent of social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, and YouTube has revolutionized how people communicate and 
share information.  Facebook has over one billion users worldwide, and 
one out of every seven online minutes is spent on the site alone.1  
Excluding mobile users, Americans log approximately 10.5 billion minutes 
on Facebook daily.2  Twitter, the popular micro-blogging site on which 
users can “tweet” messages of 140 characters or less, has gone from 
processing 5,000 tweets a day in 2007 (within a year of its launch) to over 
400 million tweets daily in 2012.3  According to the Pew Institute, 65% of 
adult Americans maintain at least one social networking profile.4 
For lawyers in particular, the legal profession’s embrace of social media 
has evolved from the digital equivalent of a perfunctory handshake, to a 
full-on bear hug of a long-lost friend.  According to a recent study by 
American Lawyer Media (ALM), nearly 75% of law firms in the United 
States employ social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, and YouTube for marketing purposes.5  In another study 
performed by the American Bar Association (ABA), 88% of the responding 
law firms reported having a LinkedIn presence, while 55% acknowledged 
using Facebook and another 13% can be found on Twitter.6  Moreover, 
 
1. Emil Protalinski, Facebook Accounts for 1 in Every 7 Online Minutes, ZDNET.COM (Dec. 27, 
2011, 3:55 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-accounts-for-1-in-every-7-online-
minutes/6639. 
2. Emil Protalinski, 10.5 Billion Minutes Spent on Facebook Daily, Excluding Mobile, 
ZDNET.COM (Mar. 28, 2012, 5:28 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/10-5-billion-
minutes-spent-on-facebook-daily-excluding-mobile/11034; Kevin Weil, Measuring Tweets, TWITTER 
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://blog.twitter.com/2010/02/measuring-tweets.html. 
3. Anna Gervai, Twitter Statistics—Updated Stats for 2011, MARKETINGGUM.COM (July 
2011), http://www.marketinggum.com/twitter-statistics-2011-updated-stats/; Matt McGee, With 
400 Million Tweets Per Day, Twitter Spending “Inordinate Resources” on Improving Content Discovery, 
MARKETINGLAND.COM (June 7, 2012, 2:33 PM), http://marketingland.com/twitter-400-million-
tweets-daily-improving-content-discovery-13581. 
4. MARY MADDEN & KATHRYN ZICKUHR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., 65% OF ONLINE ADULTS 
USE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES: WOMEN MAINTAIN THEIR FOOTHOLD ON SNS USE AND 
OLDER AMERICANS ARE STILL COMING ABOARD (Aug. 2011), available at 
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/ 2011/PIP-SNS-Update-2011.pdf. 
5. 2012 Am. Law. Tech. Survey: Highlights from Our 17th Annual Survey of Law Firm 
Technology, AMERICANLAWYER.COM, http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleALD.jsp?id= 
1202575625114&Highlights_from_the_2012_Am_Law_Tech_Survey&slreturn=20130030145246 
(click on “Social Networking” tab) (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
6. Robert Ambrogi, ABA Survey Shows Growth in Lawyers’ Social Media Use, 
LAWSITESBLOG.COM (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2012/08/aba-survey-shows-
growth-in-lawyers-social-media-use.html (citing 2012 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: 
WEB AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (v. IV)). 
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22% of the lawyers surveyed indicated their firms maintain an online blog 
(an increase from the previous year’s 15%).7 
Additionally, a lawyer’s use of social media goes beyond using such 
platforms merely as marketing tools.  In an age in which seemingly 
everyone is sharing the details of their lives online, lawyers use social 
networking sites for discovery in all types of litigation, ranging from family 
law and criminal proceedings to personal injury, employment, commercial, 
and even intellectual property matters.8  Social media content is used in 
virtually all aspects of litigation, posing new questions about privacy issues 
and the parameters of discovery in the digital age and raising issues of 
authentication and other evidentiary hurdles.9  Social media brings new 
causes of action (e.g., libel by Twitter) and innovative approaches to 
common problems.  For example, a growing number of jurisdictions, 
including courts in both the United Kingdom and the United States, now 
permit service of process via social networking sites for those hard to reach 
through more traditional avenues of communication.10   
However, emerging technologies also raise new ethical quandaries for 
lawyers.  Before an attorney “friends” a client or tweets about his or her 
latest big deal or courtroom triumph, the attorney should consider how 
this paradigm shift (represented by social networking) shapes the ethical 
landscape for lawyers.  This Article examines these ethical issues in light of 
the changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct approved in the 
wake of the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 (the Commission), as well 
as evolving case law from around the country, particularly with regard to 
the following: a lawyer’s duty to provide competent representation; a 
lawyer’s communications with a client and duty of confidentiality; a 
 
7. Id. 
8. See Steven S. Gensler, Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 ARK. L. REV. 7, 10 (2012) 
(inquiring as to whether “the existing discovery scheme [can] adapt to adequately deal with social-
media discovery”); Sandra Hornberger, Social Networking Websites: Impact on Litigation and the Legal 
Profession in Ethics, Discovery, and Evidence, 27 TOURO L. REV. 279, 279–81 (2011) (explaining why 
courts must adapt to changes in the discovery process because of evolving technology and the advent 
of social networks). 
9. See, e.g., John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence from 
Social Media Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 469 (2011) (“Litigators in all areas of civil 
litigation need to understand . . . the types of useful evidence to be gleaned from social networking 
sites, . . . as well as the authentication issues and privacy concerns that have been raised with respect 
to the admissibility of content from a social networking profile.”). 
10. John G. Browning, Your Facebook Status—“Served”: Service of Process Using Social 
Networking Sites, 2 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 159, 173–75 (2012).  See generally id. at 165–73 
(discussing how the concept of service of process via social media has spread to countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Singapore). 
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lawyer’s duty to gather information in an ethically responsible manner; a 
lawyer’s duty to preserve information; and a lawyer’s duty to behave 
ethically where jurors are concerned.  Legal scholars argue that new media 
platforms such as Facebook or Twitter mandate the creation of new rules 
of ethics for attorneys while additionally requiring that attorneys 
unfamiliar with evolving technology become informed of its uses.11 
This Article, however, argues that none of these positions represents a 
pragmatic or viable approach to the ethical questions raised by a lawyer’s 
use of social media.  While the advent of social networking has irrevocably 
altered the legal landscape, these new forms of communication are still 
governed by the same common denominator: they remain forms of 
communication, albeit electronically stored and transmitted, rather than 
memorialized on paper.  As the recent amendments to the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct reflect, the “old” rules fit the “new” 
technology sufficiently to fulfill the goals of adequately protecting both the 
profession and the public.  As the Commission itself concluded in its 
December 2011 report, “In general, we have found that the principles 
underlying our current Model Rules are applicable to these new 
developments.  As a result, many of our recommendations involve 
clarifications and expansions of existing Rules and policies rather than an 
overhaul.”12 
 
11. See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Ethics of Lawyer Social Networking, 73 ALB. L. REV. 113, 137 
(2009) (“[T]he constant addition of social networking tools to the array of communications methods 
that lawyers use every day has already made [the ABA Guidelines] incomplete.”); Christina Parajon 
Skinner, The Unprofessional Sides of Social Media and Social Networking: How Current Standards Fall 
Short, 63 S.C. L. REV. 241, 284 (2011) (“[O]ur current standards of professionalism, and the ethical 
rules on which they lean, are inadequate to curtail unprofessional social media use and social 
networking.  But, for better or for worse, we live in the Facebook age.  Unregulated, these tools pose 
risks to our professionalism.  However, with proper guidance, they can be powerful and productive 
tools for the legal community.”); Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social 
Networking in the Legal Field: Just “Face” It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 358 (2010) (calling for the 
adoption of “written guidelines specifically and directly addressing the use of social networks and 
their potential to affect the legal community”); Samuel C. Stretton, Changing Times Mean Changing 
Ethics Issues for Lawyers, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.briggs.com/files/upload/Magnuson_NCACC_04.pdf (“[L]awyers, even those who aren’t 
truly into computer technology, may have to start spending some money and taking some courses to 
learn.”). 
12. Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Commission 
on Ethics 20/20 to ABA Entities et al., at 2 (Dec. 28, 2011), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111228_summary_of_ethics_20_2
0_commission_actions_december_2011_final.authcheckdam.pdf.  While ethical issues can, and 
certainly do, arise from lawyers’ use of social media in marketing their practices, this Article focuses 
primarily on ethical concerns arising from the use—or misuse—of social media as a part of the actual 
practice of law, including the gathering of information, preservation of evidence, selection of jurors, 
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II.     THE ABA ETHICS 20/20 COMMISSION, THE DUTY OF COMPETENT 
REPRESENTATION, AND A NATIONWIDE TREND 
In 2009, then-ABA President, Carolyn Lamm, announced the creation 
of the Commission on Ethics 20/20.13  The Commission’s purpose was to 
conduct “a thorough review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct” and the regulation of the legal profession against the backdrop 
of advances in technology and the globalization of the legal practice.14  
Over the course of three years, the Commission studied how both 
technology and globalization influence the practice of law and how the 
regulation of the profession should be updated in light of this impact.15  
Regarding technology, the Commission noted: 
 
[It] affects nearly every aspect of legal work, including how we store 
confidential information, communicate with clients, conduct discovery, 
engage in research, and market legal services.  Even more fundamentally, 
technology has transformed the delivery of legal services by changing where 
and how those services are delivered (e.g., in an office, over the Internet or 
through virtual law offices), and it is having a related impact on the cost of, 
and the public’s access to, these services.16 
 
After the study concluded, the Commission circulated its report, invited 
comment, and “split its recommendations to the [ABA House of 
Delegates]” for consideration at the ABA’s annual meeting in August 
2012; a second set of resolutions will be submitted for consideration in 
2013.17  While several resolutions involve issues related to the 
globalization of the legal practice (such as outsourcing legal services and 
changes in admission standards), Resolution 105A: Technology and 
Confidentiality18 is most germane to this Article.  The Commission cited 
the impact of technology in its overview report filed in August 2012, 
 
etc.  Moreover, while ethical prohibitions against ex parte contact with judges is a ripe area of critical 
analysis, it is best examined in the context of a discussion focusing on judicial ethics opinions 
addressing the propriety of judges’ activities on social media.  As such, that subject is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
13. About Us, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_ 
commission_on_ethics_20_20/about_us.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 4 (Aug. 2012), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120508_ 
ethics_20 _20_final_hod_introdution_and_overview_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
17. Id. at 1. 
18. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
RESOLUTION 105A (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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noting that it “has irrevocably changed and continues to alter the practice 
of law in fundamental ways. . . .  Lawyers must understand technology in 
order to provide clients with the competent and cost-effective services that 
they expect and deserve.”19  In this same report, the Commission also 
noted that while technology can both increase the quality and decrease the 
cost of legal services, “[l]awyers . . . need to understand that technology 
can pose certain risks to clients’ confidential information and that 
reasonable safeguards are ethically required.”20 
At the heart of the changes proposed by the Commission, and approved 
by the ABA, was one core tenet of the practice of law—competence.21  
Model Rule 1.1 provides: “A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness[,] and preparation reasonably necessary for 
the representation.”22  The Commission’s change can be found in 
Comment 6 to Rule 1.1, which now provides as follows: “To maintain the 
requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in 
the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with 
relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply 
with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is 
subject.”23 
The additional text to Rule 1.1 mandates that competency mean more 
than keeping current with statutory developments or common law changes 
in one’s particular field, but also requires having sufficient familiarity with, 
and proficiency in, technology, which may impact both the substantive 
area of legal practice itself and how the lawyer delivers these services.  
Regarding the latter, the Commission noted “a lawyer would have 
difficulty providing competent legal services in today’s environment 
without knowing how to use email or create an electronic document.”24  
It further explained that staying current with “the benefits and risks 
 
19. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 3 (Aug. 2012), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120508_ 
ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdution_and_overview_report.authcheckdam.pdf 
20. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
RESOLUTION 105A, at 6 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf. 
21. Id. at 3. 
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012). 
23. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
RESOLUTION 105A, at 3 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf. 
24. Id. 
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associated with relevant technology”25 pertains to “how lawyers conduct 
investigations, engage in legal research, advise their clients, and conduct 
discovery.  These tasks now require lawyers to have a firm grasp on how 
electronic information is created, stored, and retrieved.”26 
An understanding of social networking sites, such as Facebook, is pivotal 
to accomplishing lawyerly tasks in the digital age.  After all, with numerous 
family lawyers frequently making use of incriminating content from social 
networking sites, can family law practitioners truly claim they meet the 
obligation of competence if they fail to search the Facebook pages of both 
the client and the adverse spouse?27  In an era in which a growing number 
of states pass laws outlining how to administer an individual’s digital assets 
(such as a decedent’s Facebook page), the question arises as to whether a 
wills and estate planning specialist truly addresses all of his clients’ needs if 
the attorney is not taking digital assets into consideration.28  While the 
changes made by Comment 6 to Rule 1.1 are silent as to the specifics, the 
sheer pervasiveness of social media in our modern society, coupled with its 
relative ease of use, demonstrates that a lawyer who ignores social media 
will fail to provide competent representation. 
Additionally, while not addressed in the changes promulgated by the 
ABA, the duty of diligence in Model Rule 1.3 has bearing on this 
discussion as well.  Comment 1 to Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer 
must . . . act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”29  An 
issue arises as to whether one is truly zealously advocating for a client if the 
attorney fails to check the Facebook page of her client’s soon-to-be ex-
spouse for potentially case-altering online evidence.  In today’s world, 
where so much information is available online, and at a time when the 
majority of one’s peers are making effective use of such information, the 
 
25. Id. 
26. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, at 4 (Aug. 
2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012 
0508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_ introdution_and_overview_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
27. See also Big Surge in Social Networking Evidence Says Survey of Nation’s Top Divorce Lawyers: 
Facebook Is Primary Source for Compromising Information, AAML.ORG (Feb. 10, 2010), 
http://aaml.org/about-the-academy/press/press-releases/e-discovery/big-surge-social-networking-evid 
ence-says-survey- (revealing 81% of respondents used such evidence in their cases). 
28. See John Conner, Comment, Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning for a Person’s 
Digital Assets After Death, 3 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 301, 305 (2011) (describing digital 
assets); see also Laura E. Stegossi, Estate Planning and Administration in the Digital Age, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202586465130 
(“A few states, namely Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma[,] and Rhode Island, have passed laws 
granting an individual’s representative the right to access and manage certain digital accounts.”). 
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2012). 
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answer must be a resounding “yes.” 
The Commission’s revision of the standard of competent representation 
can hardly be called a radical shift from the norms of practice.  To the 
contrary, the revision reflects not just the realities of practice in the twenty-
first century, but also a growing trend among courts throughout the 
United States to hold lawyers professionally accountable when it comes to 
making use of social media and other online resources.30  One author has 
gone so far as to state that “[i]t should now be a matter of professional 
competence for attorneys to take the time to investigate social networking 
sites.”31 
Numerous state courts considering due diligence issues recognize an 
implicit “duty to Google.”  In Munster v. Groce,32 an Indiana appellate 
court was incredulous that the plaintiff’s attorney trying to serve the absent 
defendant, Groce, had failed to Google him as a matter of due diligence.33  
The opinion noted the court itself had done so and immediately obtained 
search results that yielded a different address for Groce, as well as “an 
obituary for Groce’s mother that listed numerous surviving relatives who 
might have known his whereabouts.”34  Additionally, in Dubois v. Butler 
ex rel. Butler,35 a Florida appellate court questioned the effectiveness of an 
attorney who only checked directory assistance in an effort to get an 
address to serve the missing defendant.36  The court compared such a 
method in the age of the Internet and social media as the equivalent to 
using “the horse and buggy and the eight track stereo.”37  Likewise, in the 
Louisiana case of Weatherly v. Optimum Asset Management, Inc.,38 the 
appellate court considered the validity of a tax sale of an office 
condominium where the sheriff’s office had sent notice to the property’s 
former owner/assignor, but never notified the current owner/assignee.39  
 
30. See Sharon Nelson, John Simek & Jason Foltin, The Legal Implications of Social Networking, 
22 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 11–14 (2009) (discussing the growing trend of using various social media 
platforms in case development). 
31. Id. at 14. 
32. Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
33. Id. at 61 & n.3. 
34. Id. at 61 n.3. 
35. Dubois v. Butler ex rel. Butler, 901 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
36. Id. at 1031. 
37. Id.; see also Michael Whiteman, The Death of Twentieth-Century Authority, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. DISCOURSE 27, 43 (2010) (emphasizing the position taken by the court “seem[ed] to 
demonstrate that the [Internet] is not only acceptable, but actually preferable, to the old methods of 
finding people”). 
38. Weatherly v. Optimum Asset Mgmt., Inc., 923 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 2005). 
39. Id. at 120. 
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Notice was published in a local newspaper, which proved little help to 
Weatherly, the current owner, who lived out of state.40  Weatherly sued 
“to annul the tax sale” while the new owners defended it on grounds that 
Weatherly was not reasonably identifiable for purposes of the notice 
requirement.41  The court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that 
Weatherly was “reasonably identifiable” and that the adverse party had not 
met its responsibility to exercise due diligence after the trial judge’s own 
performance of an Internet search easily found Mr. Weatherly.42 
In 2010, the Missouri Supreme Court in Johnson v. McCullough43 
revealed a new standard for providing competent representation in the 
digital age: the duty to conduct online research during the voir dire 
process.44  During the voir dire phase of a medical malpractice trial, 
plaintiff’s counsel inquired whether anyone on the venire panel had ever 
been a party to a lawsuit.45  While several members of the panel were 
forthcoming in their responses, one prospective juror, Mims, was not.46  
Following a defense verdict, plaintiff’s counsel researched Mims on 
Missouri’s online document database, Case.net, and learned of multiple 
previous lawsuits involving the juror.47  The trial court granted a motion 
for new trial based on Mims’s intentional concealment of her litigation 
history, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.48  The court reasoned: 
 
[I]n light of advances in technology allowing greater access to information 
that can inform a trial court about the past litigation history of venire 
members, it is appropriate to place a greater burden on the parties to bring 
such matters to the court’s attention at an earlier stage.  Litigants should not 
be allowed to wait until a verdict has been rendered to perform a Case.net 
search . . . when, in many instances, the search also could have been done in 
the final stages of jury selection or after the jury was selected but prior to the 
jury being empanelled.49 
 
Taking this into consideration, the court imposed a new affirmative duty 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 121. 
42. Id. at 121, 123. 
43. Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
44. Id. at 558–59; see also Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: One 
Click at a Time, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 611, 628 (2012) (“After the court’s decision in Johnson, 
Missouri began setting aside time to allow attorneys to research jurors prior to the start of trial.”). 
45. Johnson, 306 S.W.3d at 554. 
46. Id. at 554–55. 
47. Id. at 555. 
48. Id. at 555, 559. 
49. Id. at 558–59. 
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on lawyers by holding that “a party must use reasonable efforts to examine 
the litigation history on Case.net of those jurors selected but not 
empanelled and present to the trial court any relevant information prior to 
trial.”50 
Another example of courts holding lawyers to a higher standard of 
competency, at least regarding technology, can be seen in decisions 
involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  In Cannedy v. 
Adams,51 the petitioner challenged his conviction for the molestation of 
his stepdaughter on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.52  Under 
applicable law, in order to meet the threshold for ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Cannedy needed to prove his attorney’s representation did not 
meet the standard of reasonableness in addition to showing that a 
reasonable probability existed that, but for the errors of counsel, the 
proceeding’s results would have been different (i.e., the Strickland test).53  
The Strickland standard is high, with the review of an attorney’s 
performance being “highly deferential” and supported by the “strong 
presumption” that counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment and 
rendered adequate assistance.54  In Cannedy, the petitioner maintained 
that his trial counsel failed to inquire about a friend of the purported 
victim who had seen a posting on the Internet in which the victim 
admitted fabricating the molestation allegations.55  This friend and her 
mother would have testified that she looked at the victim’s online profile 
and saw statements by the young woman denying any abuse had 
occurred.56  The witness would have brought to light that the victim had 
 
50. Id. (emphasis added); see also John Constance, Note, Attorney Duty to Search Case.net for 
Juror Nondisclosure: Missouri Supreme Court Rule 69.025, 76 MO. L. REV. 493, 494 (2010) (noting 
the court enacted a litigation history search on prospective jurors “[i]n an attempt to reduce the 
number of retrials granted due to juror nondisclosure”). 
51. Cannedy v. Adams, No. ED CV 08-1230-CJC(E), 2009 WL 3711958 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 
2009). 
52. Id. at *1. 
53. Id. at *15 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 697 (1984)).  The 
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is as follows: “Petitioner must prove: (1) 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 697). 
54. Id. (citing Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 610 (9th Cir. 2004)).  See generally Adam 
Lamparello, Establishing Guidelines for Attorney Representation of Criminal Defendants at the 
Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 62 ME. L. REV. 97, 108–09 (2010) (acknowledging the Strickland 
case controlled claims for ineffective assistance of counsel for many years). 
55. Cannedy, 2009 WL 3711958, at *1, *16. 
56. Id. at *16 (citing a written statement by the friend of the victim, which was attached to 
Cannedy’s motion for new trial). 
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made up the claims of molestation against Cannedy “because she wanted 
to move to her natural father’s home in Northern California where she was 
[happier] and had more friends.”57  Cannedy claimed that despite telling 
his trial counsel about this witness and the online recantation, the lawyer 
did nothing.58  The trial attorney later acknowledged that such a 
statement would have had “tremendous value to him as defense 
counsel, . . . [and] that if he could have ‘proved that [the stepdaughter] 
did, in fact, put [the statement] on her [MySpace] page or . . . [Facebook 
page],’ . . . such evidence would have provided a motive for her to make up 
a false charge against the defendant.”59 
The appellate court agreed the attorney should have followed this lead 
and therefore concluded that the attorney’s representation did not meet 
the Strickland standard for professional competence.  The court further 
stated, “Any attorney acting reasonably would have considered the 
proposed testimony to be extremely significant, potentially exculpatory 
evidence.”60  While noting the unreasonableness of the attorney’s effort 
and the prejudice that resulted from it were “fairly clear,” the court was at 
a loss to explain why it had happened.61  It ultimately concluded that, 
among other potential reasons, the trial counsel may have simply been 
technologically incompetent, speculating that he “misunderstood the 
workings” of the website “in ways that caused him to depreciate the value 
of the information.”62 
Other efforts to characterize a lawyer’s supposed failure to make use of 
social networking evidence as ineffective assistance of counsel have been 
less successful.  In People v. Sawyer,63 the defendant argued that his 
conviction for criminal sexual conduct involving his daughter was the 
result of, among other reasons, ineffective assistance of counsel.64  Sawyer 
claimed his lawyer failed to admit Facebook posts that impeached the 
alleged victim’s credibility; in the posts, she discussed using marijuana 
throughout the trial despite her sworn testimony “that she had stopped 
using the drug.”65  Despite Sawyer’s claim that such exhibits would have 
been “game changing,” the court was unconvinced and denied the claim 
 
57. Id. (citing a written statement by the witness). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at *23. 
60. Id. at *29. 
61. Id. at *34 n.19. 
62. Id. 
63. People v. Sawyer, No. 306271, 2012 WL 4899690 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2012). 
64. Id. at *1, *8–9. 
65. Id. at *10–11. 
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for ineffective assistance of counsel.66  It noted Sawyer’s lawyer had closely 
questioned the victim about these Facebook posts and that failure to 
introduce the exhibit could have been sound trial strategy because “trial 
counsel effectively brought to light the most damaging statements in the 
Facebook feed, raising questions concerning the victim’s credibility 
without bringing the exhibit in.”67 
Cannedy and Sawyer demonstrate that an attorney’s comfort level with 
technology, particularly the evidence to be gleaned from social networking 
sites, will be an issue when analyzing effectiveness of counsel.68  In Sawyer, 
for example, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected in 
part because the lawyer was aware of the impeaching Facebook postings 
and effectively used them in cross examination (even if he did not admit 
them into evidence).69 
The heightened technology-use standard enunciated in Johnson was later 
codified in Missouri Supreme Court Rule 69.025, which became effective 
January 1, 2011.70  It mandates background Internet searches on potential 
jurors, specifically Case.net searches of a potential juror’s litigation 
history.71  However, the first reported case interpreting Rule 69.025 and 
the Johnson standard only raised more questions about the scope and 
timing of such Internet searches by trial counsel. 
In Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,72 the plaintiffs sued ConAgra for 
personal injury damages, claiming Elaine Khoury suffered from 
bronchiolitis obliterans, a lung disease supposedly caused by chemical 
vapors emitted when Elaine prepared and consumed ConAgra’s microwave 
popcorn.73  The day before voir dire, when the members of the venire 
 
66. Id. at *11. 
67. Id. 
68. See Cannedy v. Adams, No. ED CV 08-1230-CJC(E), 2009 WL 3711958, at *29 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 4, 2009) (stressing the importance of investigating an AOL online message the victim had 
posted); Sawyer, 2012 WL 4899690, at *11 (admitting the attorney effectively used evidence from a 
Facebook news feed); see also Kenneth N. Rashbaum, Matthew F. Knouff & Dominique Murray, 
Admissibility of Non-U.S. Electronic Evidence, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2011, at 1, 59–60 (“A few 
years ago, social media and networking sites would not have registered on the average practitioner’s 
radar.  However, potential evidence from such sites must be preserved if relevant, and at least one [] 
[c]ourt has now held that counsel’s failure to investigate and introduce evidence from such social 
networking sites could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” (citations omitted)). 
69. Sawyer, 2012 WL 4899690, at *11. 
70. MO. R. CIV. P. 69.025; see John Constance, Note, Attorney Duty to Search Case.net for Juror 
Nondisclosure: Missouri Supreme Court Rule 69.025, 76 MO. L. REV. 493, 494 (2011) (explaining the 
“official court rule explaining the requirement was issued shortly after the Johnson decision”). 
71. MO. R. CIV. P. 69.025. 
72. Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
73. Id. at 193. 
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panel would be questioned about their prior litigation history, both sides 
conducted searches of Missouri’s Case.net.74  Both “parties exercised their 
peremptory strikes” and their strikes for cause, and a jury was 
empanelled.75  The next morning, ConAgra’s counsel alerted the court 
that their Internet research revealed Facebook postings by one juror, 
Piedimonte, indicating bias and an intentional failure to disclose 
information.76  The attorneys argued Piedimonte was “a prolific poster for 
anti-corporation, organic foods.”77  ConAgra requested a mistrial, or 
alternatively, to strike Piedimonte from the jury.78  The “court denied the 
motion for mistrial[,] but” did strike Piedimonte from the jury.79  The 
trial proceeded with a full jury panel and three, rather than four, alternate 
jurors.80  After a defense verdict, the Khourys appealed.81  The Khourys 
argued, among other things, that Piedimonte should not have been 
removed from the jury and that ConAgra’s broader Internet search was not 
timely.82  The appellate court rejected this argument, observing that the 
Johnson standard and the subsequent Missouri Supreme Court Rule 
69.025 were limited to Case.net searches of a potential juror’s litigation 
history, not a broader search for any alleged material nondisclosure.83  As 
the court pointed out: 
 
The rule could have similarly required “reasonable investigation” into other 
areas of “possible bias” and could have required such “reasonable 
investigation” to include a search of Internet social and business networking 
sites such as Facebook, MySpace, or LinkedIn, to name a few.  And, the rule 
could have similarly required “reasonable investigation” of potential jurors 
via Internet search engines such as Google or Yahoo!, to name a few.  Or, the 
rule could have simply required a blanket “Internet search” on “any and all 










81. Id. at 195, 199. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 202; see Chip Babcock & Luke Gilman, Use of Social Media in Voir Dire, 60 ADVOC. 
(TEX.), Fall 2012, at  44, 47, available at http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/Advocate 
_V60_Fall2012.pdf (“The Missouri Supreme Court recently noted that the availability of technology 
to investigate a [juror’s] prior litigation history obligates counsel to use reasonable efforts to 
investigate jurors early in the case.”). 
84. Khoury, 368 S.W.3d at 202 n.12. 
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Although the appellate court limited its reasoning to the plain text of 
the rule, it did acknowledge the potential in the digital age for revisiting 
Rule 69.025.  It stated that “the day may come that technological advances 
may compel our Supreme Court to re-think the scope of required 
‘reasonable investigation’ into the background of jurors that may impact 
challenges to the veracity of responses given in voir dire before the jury is 
empanelled.”85 
Requiring a degree of familiarity with technology as a key component of 
competent representation by counsel is hardly an American innovation.  In 
2004, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) modified its Code of 
Professional Conduct to address technology competence.  Chapter 2 of the 
Code had long provided that a “lawyer owes the client a duty to be 
competent to perform any legal services undertaken on the client’s 
behalf.”86  The CBA subsequently added Commentary 4, specifically 
referring to technological competence: 
 
Competence involves more than an understanding of legal principles; it 
involves an adequate knowledge of the practice and procedures by which 
those principles can be effectively applied.  To accomplish this, the lawyer 
should keep abreast of developments in all areas in which the lawyer 
[practices].  The lawyer should also develop and maintain a facility with 
advances in technology in areas in which the lawyer [practices] to maintain a 
level of competence that meets the standard reasonably expected of lawyers in 
similar practice circumstances.87 
 
III.     DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
Another area rife with potential ethical pitfalls in the age of Facebook 
and Twitter is that of client communications and acting competently to 
preserve client confidentiality.  Here again, the ABA Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 weighed in with a change to Model Rule 1.6, dealing with 
confidential information.88  A new section, 1.6(c), provides the following: 
“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating 
to the representation of a client.”89  While the earlier version of Rule 1.6 
set forth the lawyer’s duty not to reveal a client’s confidential information, 
 
85. Id. at 203. 
86. CANADIAN BAR ASS’N CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT ch. 2, R. 1 (2009). 
87. Id. ch. 2, cmt. 4 (emphasis added). 
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2012) (providing lawyers with the 
model rule regarding information confidentiality). 
89. Id. 
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it did not indicate what ethical obligations lawyers have to prevent such 
disclosures and how to safeguard a client’s confidential information in the 
digital age. 
The proposal behind adding 1.6(c) identified three distinct scenarios 
involving technology and the inadvertent disclosure of confidential 
information.  “First, information can be inadvertently disclosed, such as 
when an email is sent to the wrong person.”90  Second, “information can 
be accessed without authority” through a data security lapse by a third 
party hacking into a lawyer’s email account or a law firm’s private 
network.91  The third type of disclosure can occur “when employees or 
other personnel release it without authority, such as when an employee 
posts confidential information on the Internet.”92   
Rule 1.6(c) imposes an ethical obligation on attorneys to take reasonable 
efforts to prevent such disclosures.93  This could conceivably include 
implementing encryption and other data security measures, developing a 
social media policy for the attorneys and staff, and, of course, exercising 
common sense when using social media.94  Comment 18 to the Rule 
acknowledges that disclosures can occur even if the lawyer takes all 
reasonable precautions.95  Yet, even if such precautions cannot ensure the 
protection of a client’s confidential information in every circumstance, the 
black letter language of Rule 1.6 nevertheless imposes on lawyers the duty 
to take reasonable precautions.96  As far as guidance on the steps that 
might be considered “reasonable,” the Commission declined to provide 
specific suggestions, primarily because “technology is changing too rapidly 
to offer such guidance[,] and [] the particular measures lawyers should use 
will necessarily change as technology evolves and as new risks emerge and 
new security procedures become available.”97  However, the Commission 
identified a non-exhaustive list of factors that lawyers should consider 
when safeguarding clients’ confidential information.  These include “the 
 
90. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 




93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2012). 
94. See id. R. 1.6(c) & cmt. 17 (requiring lawyers to choose a reasonable form of 
communication with an expectation of privacy). 
95. Id. R. 1.6(c) & cmt. 18. 
96. Id. 
97. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
RESOLUTION 105A, at 5 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional 
safeguards are not employed, . . . and the extent to which the safeguards 
adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a 
device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use).”98 
Such issues are hardly new grounds for ethics authorities.  In 2010, the 
State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility 
and Conduct issued Formal Opinion No. 2010­179.99  In it, the 
committee confronted the issue of whether “an attorney violate[s] the 
duties of confidentiality and competence . . . by using technology to 
transmit or store confidential client information when the technology 
[might] be susceptible to unauthorized access by third parties.”100  These 
technology concerns are particularly relevant, given the proliferation of 
smartphones and tablets that enable attorneys to work virtually from 
anywhere, as well as the rapid adoption of “bring your own device” 
(BYOD) policies in many work environments.  Like the ABA 
Commission, California’s committee identified numerous factors to 
consider when determining whether an ethical violation occurred, 
including “the urgency of the situation,” the client’s instructions, and any 
special circumstances.101 
The ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility also entered the fray.  In Formal Opinion 11­459,102 this 
committee discussed the duty to protect the confidentiality of email 
communications with a client.103  The committee imposed a duty on the 
lawyer to “warn the client about the risk of sending or receiving electronic 
communications [to which] a third party may gain access.”104  In 
particular, the committee called for lawyers to “first consider whether, 
given the client’s situation, there is a significant risk that third parties will 
have access to the communication” and, if so, to “take reasonable care to 
protect the confidentiality of the communications by giving appropriately 
tailored advice to the client.”105 
Given the popularity of social media and the degree to which so many 
people—including clients—employ sites like Facebook and Twitter as 
 
98. Id. 
99. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 
2010­179 (2010). 
100. Id. at 1. 
101. Id. at 6. 
102. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11­459 (2011). 
103. Id. at 1. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 4. 
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avenues of communication, it is easy to envision lawyers tweeting about a 
key ruling or griping about a client who gives misleading information.106  
For attorneys who have developed a social, as well as a professional, 
relationship with the client, a general counsel’s seemingly casual invitation 
via Facebook to a weekend barbecue might also include a reference to an 
upcoming matter of business, e.g., “I’m worried about our CFO’s 
deposition.  He makes a lousy witness and has an axe to grind.  See you 
Saturday.”107  Lawyers who are not careful with their own 
communications, or who fail to remind clients to use more secure 
channels, run the risk of revealing case strategy or even privileged 
information to a whole host of third party Facebook friends, Twitter 
followers, and even potential strangers receiving the information via “re-
tweets” or status “shares.”108  With sites like Facebook regularly tweaking 
their user privacy options, it is not enough simply to depend on the 
integrity of a user’s privacy settings.109  Checking in on FourSquare or 
revealing one’s location through other sites with geo-location features can 
expose something deemed private to curious eyes.110  In addition, even 
having one’s LinkedIn contacts list or Facebook friends publicly viewable 
poses the risk of disclosing a confidential relationship.  Consequently, 
practitioners should take care to police not only their own 
communications using social media, but they should also advise their 
clients about potential threats to the confidentiality of their own online 
messages. 
Using social networking platforms to discuss privileged communications 
also invites the danger of a confidentiality waiver.  In one recent case, a 
California court found the plaintiff in a copyright infringement lawsuit 
 
106. See Michael E. Getnick, Social Media: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 81 N.Y. ST. B.J. 5, 
5 (2009) (suggesting the proscription in Model Rule 3.6 against publicizing extrajudicial statements 
applies equally to blogs and social networking sites just as it does to traditional media outlets). 
107. Cf. Karen Erger, Will You Be My (Facebook) Friend?, 98 ILL. B.J. 210, 211 (2010) 
(warning that “friending” on sites like Facebook requires caution from attorneys to not disclose 
confidential information or create attorney–client relationships inadvertently). 
108. See Robert Tiedeken, The Changing Face of Tort Litigation, 35 WYO. LAW. 11, 11 (2012) 
(focusing on the importance of using social networking sites to investigate potential clients prior to 
litigation and warning clients once pretrial begins against using Facebook and Twitter). 
109. See Lindsay S. Feuer, Note, Who Is Poking Around Your Facebook Profile?: The Need to 
Reform the Stored Communications Act to Reflect a Lack of Privacy on Social Networking Websites, 40 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 486 (2011) (discussing the privacy policies of Facebook, Twitter, and 
MySpace and warning that there is never a guarantee of privacy on these sites). 
110. See Margaret M. DiBianca, Ethical Risks Arising from Lawyers’ Use of (and Refusal to Use) 
Social Media, 12 DEL. L. REV. 179, 190 (2011) (providing several hypothetical examples of how 
geographical locating applications associated with social networking sites could potentially disclose 
confidential information). 
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had waived the attorney–client privilege through emails to third parties 
and blog posts discussing conversations with counsel.111  The plaintiff, 
Lenz, sued Universal Music Corporation, alleging Universal knowingly 
misrepresented that a video posted by the plaintiff on YouTube infringed 
Universal’s copyright in a song.112  After filing suit, but prior to trial, Lenz 
visited several online chat rooms and blogs where she discussed, among 
other things, conversations she had with counsel concerning her 
motivation for filing the lawsuit.113  After Universal discovered the posts, 
it argued that in making them Lenz had waived the attorney–client 
privilege.114  The court agreed the online communications related to the 
substance of the plaintiff’s conversations with her lawyer waived the 
privilege.115 
In addition, given the expanding body of cases nationally in which 
courts have rejected parties’ objections based on privacy when it comes to 
the discoverability of communications made via social media, lawyers or 
attorneys should advise their clients not to be pulled into a false sense of 
security by their profiles’ privacy settings.  For example, in one personal 
injury case, the plaintiff resisted efforts by the defendant to gain access to 
her Facebook page, claiming she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the statements she posted there.116  The court disagreed, holding she must 
disclose everything on the Facebook page in discovery.117  The court had 
little sympathy for the plaintiff’s privacy concerns: 
 
By definition, there can be little privacy on a social networking website.  
Facebook’s foremost purpose is to “help you connect and share with the 
people in your life.”  That can only be accomplished by sharing information 
with others.  Only the uninitiated or foolish could believe that Facebook is 
an online lockbox of secrets.118 
 
Sadly, there is no shortage of examples of online breaches of 
confidentiality.  In 2006, an Oregon lawyer posted confidential personal 
and medical information about a former client on a listserv, and the result 
was a ninety-day suspension.119  In Muniz v. United Parcel Service, 
 
111. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4789099, at *1, 
*5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010). 
112. Id. at *1, *5. 
113. Id. at *4. 
114. Id. at *1. 
115. Id. at *5. 
116. Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, at *6 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Nov. 8, 2011). 
117. Id. at *9, *13. 
118. Id. at *9–10. 
119. In re Quillinan, 20 DB Rptr. 288, 289, 291 (2006). 
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Inc.,120 the plaintiff’s attorney (who had prevailed in an employment 
action and was now making an application for fees) faced a potentially 
volatile situation when the other side sought attorney’s postings on social 
networking sites and on a listserv for the California Employment Lawyers 
Association (CELA).121  The attorney allegedly posted comments 
criticizing the judge and offering other opinions about the defense counsel 
and the trial.122  Because the magistrate to whom the matter was referred 
refused to compel the production of the postings on relevance grounds, she 
did not address whether such postings could be considered subject to the 
attorney work product privilege, but there were, no doubt, some tense 
moments for plaintiff’s counsel.123 
In September 2012, Anya Cintron Stern, a Miami-Dade County, 
Florida, public defender, represented Fermin Recalde on murder charges 
stemming from the fatal stabbing of his girlfriend in 2010.124  When 
Recalde’s family brought him fresh clothing to wear at trial, corrections 
officers held up the items for routine inspection.125  Stern, then thirty-one 
years old, used her cellphone to snap a photo of Recalde’s leopard print 
underwear and subsequently “posted the photo on her personal Facebook 
page with a caption suggesting the client’s family believed the underwear 
was ‘proper attire for trial.’”126  Prior to this incident, Stern allegedly 
posted on Facebook a statement that called her client’s innocence into 
question.127  Although Stern’s Facebook page was set to private, someone 
who saw the post notified Judge Leon Firtel, who subsequently granted a 
mistrial in the case.128  The Miami-Dade Public Defender’s Office 
promptly fired Stern, stating that “[w]hen a lawyer broadcasts disparaging 
and humiliating words and pictures, it undermines the basic client 
relationship and it gives the appearance that he is not receiving a fair 
trial.”129 
Similarly, in May 2010, former Illinois assistant public defender 
 
120. Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. C-09-01987-CW (DMR), 2011 WL 311374 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2011). 
121. Id. at *1–2. 
122. Id. at *8. 
123. Id. at *9. 
124. David Ovalle, Lawyer’s Facebook Photo Causes Mistrial in Miami-Dade Murder Case, 
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Kristine Ann Peshek was fired from her job and additionally received a 
sixty-day suspension of her law license for commentary posted on her blog 
that amounted to a violation of Rule 1.6.130  Peshek frequently referred to 
clients by their first names, nicknames, or jail identification numbers.131  
She also described, in sometimes graphic detail, the clients’ cases, drug use, 
and other embarrassing and potentially harmful information, even 
caustically critiquing their courtroom testimony.132  In referencing one 
client, identified as “Dennis the diabetic,” Peshek wrote that not only did 
he test positive for cocaine, but also that “[h]e was standing there in court 
stoned, right in front of the judge, probation officer, prosecutor[,] and 
defense attorney, swearing he was clean and claiming ignorance as to why 
his blood sugar wasn’t being managed well.”133  Peshek was also not shy 
about referencing the judges she appeared in front of, going so far as to 
refer to one as “Judge Clueless.”134  Sometimes online breaches of 
confidentiality bring down even the most powerful attorneys. 
While not all instances of lawyers’ online ethical lapses necessarily 
involve breaches of confidentiality, one universal theme is poor judgment.  
Just as social media has yielded an abundance of “what were you thinking” 
examples of litigants making questionable postings, attorneys have been 
guilty of becoming online cautionary tales themselves.  Consider the 
following examples: 
Jim Letten, former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 
resigned in December 2012 in the midst of an investigation into two of his 
top deputies who had ventured online to discuss pending cases before the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office, comment on presiding judges, and anonymously 
attack the objects of their office’s investigations.135  Letten, a 2001 
appointee of President George W. Bush, was the country’s longest-tenured 
U.S. Attorney before his office was rocked by scandal over the investigation 
 
130. In re Peshek, No. M.R. 23794, at *1–5 (Ill. May 18, 2010), http://www.iardc.org/ 
lawyersearch.asp (search for “Peshek”; follow “Kristine Ann Peshek” hyperlink; click on “Rules and 
Decisions” hyperlink; follow hyperlink for document type “Consents Allowed”); see also David Brazy, 
Beloit Lawyer Suspended for 60 Days over Blog Comments, GAZETTEXTRA.COM (June 25, 2011), http: 
//gazettextra.com/news/2011/jun/25/beloit-lawyer-suspended-60-days-over-blog-comments/ (noting 
that Peshek’s law license was also suspended in Wisconsin for the same blog postings). 
131. In re Peshek, No. M.R. 23794, at *2. 
132. Id. at *3. 
133. Complaint at para. 6, In re Peshek, No. M.R. 23794, available at http://www.iardc.org/ 
09CH0089CM.html. 
134. In re Peshek, No. M.R. 23794, at *4. 
135. Sari Horwitz, New Orleans U.S. Attorney Resigns Amid Scandal over Anonymous Online 
Postings, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-06/politics/ 
35650115_1_federal-investigation-attorney-general-james-cole-prosecutor. 
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into the sources of anonymous online criticism of Fred Heebe, a local 
landfill owner under federal investigation.136  Sal Perricone, one of 
Letten’s top deputies, resigned in March 2012 when it was revealed he had 
made hundreds of online posts regarding Heebe and his company on 
NOLA.com (the website of The New Orleans Times-Picayune) under the 
pseudonym “Henry L. Mencken 1951.”137  Later, Letten confirmed First 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Jan Mann had also posted numerous comments on 
the same website; according to Heebe, Mann used the website repeatedly 
to criticize him and others.138  Following the revelation, Letten promptly 
demoted Mann.139 
In a disbarment proceeding filed in December 2011, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court made note of certain comments and postings made by 
attorney Michael T. Hursey, Jr. on his MySpace page.140  These postings 
included profanity, nudity, and discussions of drug use along with the 
name of his law firm and the city in which he practiced.141 
In July 2012, Justin Marrus, a Brooklyn Assistant District Attorney and 
the son of a New York Supreme Court judge, had his Facebook page 
posted on a national media outlet.142  The page showed Marrus in 
blackface, holding a Confederate flag, and simulating prison rape.143  A 
spokesman for the D.A.’s office stated, “We think [the photos] are 
abhorrent, stupid, and childish.  [We are] asking Mr. Marrus for a full 
explanation of his conduct, which is totally unacceptable.  And we will 
take appropriate action.”144 
In February 2011, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Cox 
tweeted that live ammunition should be used on pro-labor protesters in 
Madison, Wisconsin, and he also made a number of similar politically-




138. John Simerman, Jim Letten Demotes Second-in-Command, Tries to Quietly Weather 
Scandal, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 9, 2012, 7:53 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/ 
11/letten_demotes_second-in-comma.html. 
139. Id. 
140. In re Hursey, 719 S.E.2d 670, 671 (S.C. 2011). 
141. Id. 
142. Garth Johnston, Should Brooklyn ADAs Wear Blackface, Simulate Prison Rape on Facebook?, 




145. Debra Cassens Weiss, Indiana Deputy AG Loses Job After Live Ammo Tweet, A.B.A. J. 
(Feb. 24, 2011, 6:49 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/indiana_deputy_ag_loses_ 
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General’s office terminated him, stating, “We respect individuals’ First 
Amendment right to express their personal views on private online forums, 
but as public servants we are held by the public to a higher standard, and 
we should strive for civility.”146  Cox later commented, “I think that in 
this day and age [my] tweet was not a good idea.”147 
In February 2012, an ethics complaint was filed against Jesse Raymond 
Gilsdorf, an attorney in Illinois, for “conduct . . . prejudicial to the 
administration of justice” and for “making extrajudicial statements that . . . 
would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of an adjudicative 
proceeding.”148  Gilsdorf allegedly attempted to sway public opinion 
against the prosecutor and away from his drug client by posting a video of 
police officers engaged in an undercover drug buy (entitled “Cops and 
Task Force Planting Drugs”) on YouTube in April 2011 and then linking 
it to his Facebook account.149 
In Miller v. State,150 the defendant’s robbery conviction was overturned 
because during closing argument the prosecutor played the jury a YouTube 
video “created for school administrators to see ‘how easy it was to conceal a 
weapon inside clothing.’”151  The court held the video, which was not 
admitted into evidence, “was irrelevant, prejudicial, and confused 
issues.”152 
In State v. Usee,153 a prosecutor who made racially insensitive 
comments on her public Facebook page was accused of prosecutorial 





148. Complaint at para. 20, In re Gilsdorf, No. 12PR0006 (Ill. Att’y Registration & 
Disciplinary Comm’n) (filed Feb. 6, 2012), available at https://www.iardc.org/12PR0006cm.html.  
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2012) (prohibiting attorneys involved 
in ongoing litigation from making prejudicial extrajudicial statements about the matter). 
149. Complaint at paras. 1–2, 6, 11, In re Gilsdorf, No. 12PR0006, available at https: 
//www.iardc.org/12PR0006cm.html. 
150. Miller v. State, 916 N.E.2d 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
151. Id. at 195.  See generally FED. R. EVID. 402 (providing irrelevant evidence shall not be 
admitted at trial); id. 403 (permitting judges to exclude evidence that could substantially prejudice a 
party or confuse the jury). 
152. Miller, 916 N.E.2d at 197. 
153. State v. Usee, 800 N.W.2d 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
154. See id. at 200 (denying the appellant’s contention that he was “deprived of his right to a 
fair trial by an impartial jury” because of the prosecutor’s Facebook posts); cf. Peter A. Joy, The 
Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken 
System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 400–07 (2006) (examining the relationship between prosecutorial 
misconduct and a defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial). 
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made during an attempted murder case, concerned her role as a prosecutor 
in “keep[ing] the streets of Minneapolis safe from the [Somalis]” (the 
defendant was a Somalian immigrant).155  Notwithstanding this 
attorney’s conduct, the appellate court did not overturn the defendant’s 
conviction.156 
In Guadalupe County, Texas, in May 2011, Assistant District Attorney 
Larry Bloomquist was ordered to appear before the court for violating a 
gag order after posting a status update on Facebook regarding an ongoing 
felony trial.157 
In July 2012, a former prosecutor in Norfolk, Virginia, was charged 
with making a felony threat after allegedly threatening his former employer 
in a series of Facebook posts.158 
Sarah Peterson Herr, a research attorney working for a Kansas appellate 
judge, was suspended in November 2012 pending an investigation into her 
tweets made during another attorney’s ethics hearing.159  The tweets 
criticized the former Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline’s demeanor in 
the courtroom.160  Kline was facing charges stemming from allegations 
that he misled others during an investigation into abortion providers 
(Kline is a longtime abortion opponent).161  Herr’s tweets referred to 
Kline as a “douchebag” and predicted he would be disbarred for seven 
years.162  The tweets were removed, and Herr issued an apology:  
I didn’t stop to think that in addition to communicating with a few of my 
friends on Twitter I was also communicating with the public at large, which 
was not appropriate for someone who works for the court system. . . .  I 
apologize that because the comments were made on Twitter—and thus 
public—that they were perceived as a reflection on the Kansas courts.163 
 
In April 2010, following a felony firearms case in Florida, a prosecutor 
posted a poem to Facebook about a trial which his co-counsel dubbed the 
 
155. Usee, 800 N.W.2d at 200. 
156. Id. at 201. 
157. Roy Bragg, Guadalupe County Prosecutor Fined for Facebook Comments, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS (May 11, 2011, 10:11 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/ 
article/Guadalupe-County-prosecutor-fined-for-Facebook-1376185.php. 
158. Louis Hansen, Ex-Norfolk Prosecutor Charged over Facebook Posts, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (July 
27, 2012), http://hamptonroads.com/2012/07/exnorfolk-prosecutor-charged-after-facebook-post. 
159. John Milburn, Kansas Court Staffer Suspended over Kline Tweets, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 
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“trial from hell.”164  The poem (intended to be sung to the tune of the 
theme song from “Gilligan’s Island”) went as follows: 
 
Just sit right back and you’ll hear a tale/A tale of fateful trial/That started 
from this court in St. Lucie County . . . Six jurors were ready for trial that 
day for a four-hour trial, a four-hour trial/The trial started easy enough/But 
then became rough/The judge and jury confused/If not for the courage of 
the fearless prosecutors/The trial would be lost, the trial would be lost.165 
 
Although the trial judge granted a mistrial, the parody was not cited as one 
of the grounds (it had been posted only after deliberations were over).166  
Still, Chief Assistant State Attorney Tom Bakkedahl was clearly unhappy 
with the ditty, especially regarding references to the “gang banger 
defendant” and “the weasel face” defense lawyer.167  He characterized the 
prosecutor’s conduct as “immature” behavior that his office would need to 
learn from.168 
An Oregon attorney was publicly reprimanded for unethical conduct 
that began as an online prank.169  The attorney went online to 
Classmates.com and adopted the identity of a local teacher (purportedly a 
high school classmate of the attorney).170  He posted messages suggesting 
the teacher had had sex with students.171  Although the attorney argued 
no professional misconduct was involved, the Oregon Supreme Court 
disagreed.172  The court held he had violated the Oregon Code of 
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 1­102(A)(3), which prohibits 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.173 
As the above examples show, lawyers must be aware and conscious of 
their online activity; what many believe to be innocent and harmless 
postings can have tremendous, negative impacts on their professional 
careers. 
 
164. JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING: 





169. In re Carpenter, 95 P.3d 203, 205–06 (Or. 2004). 
170. Id. at 206. 
171. Id. at 205. 
172. Id. at 207–10. 
173. Id. at 205; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012) (providing that an 
attorney who engages in conduct such as misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, or dishonesty commits 
professional misconduct).  See generally Sean Keveney, Note, The Dishonesty Rule: A Proposal for 
Reform, 81 TEX. L. REV. 381, 384–400 (2002) (discussing the background, origin, and scope of Rule 
8.4(c) and the problems associated with it). 
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IV.     ETHICAL INFORMATION GATHERING 
Another significant area of ethical concern for lawyers using social media 
involves gathering information about a party or witness.  There generally is 
not an ethical issue in looking at the publicly viewable portion of an 
individual’s social networking profile; however, what about those 
Facebook pages with privacy restrictions that allow only friends to view 
such nonpublic content?  May an attorney, or someone working for that 
attorney, attempt to become someone’s friend in order to gain such access?  
If the person is a represented party, the answer is clearly no.174 
Under Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer 
should not communicate or cause another person to communicate with an 
individual represented by counsel without the prior consent of that 
individual’s attorney.175  In May 2011, the San Diego County Bar 
Association’s Legal Ethics Committee considered this Rule’s applicability 
in the digital age after it was presented with an interesting situation in 
which a lawyer undertook representation of an allegedly wrongfully 
discharged employee.176  Although the attorney knew the defendant 
company was represented by counsel, he sent friend requests to two high-
ranking employees of the defendant employer that his client “identified as 
being dissatisfied with the employer and therefore likely to make 
disparaging comments about the employer on their social media page.”177  
The Ethics Committee ruled the lawyer’s request violated both the rule 
against contacting a represented party and the lawyer’s duty not to deceive 
others, suggesting that lawyers seeking access to a represented party on 
social media sites must either seek such information through formal 
discovery channels or contact the party’s attorney to request consent to 
such a communication.178 
 
174. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2012) (addressing the rule regarding 
communications to a person represented by an attorney). 
175. Id.; see Yvette Ostolaza & Ricardo Pellafone, Applying Model Rule 4.2 to Web 2.0: The 
Problem of Social Networking Sites, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 56, 88–92 (2010) (discussing the ethical 
problems that can arise when attorneys attempt to access private social media profiles for investigative 
purposes). 
176. See San Diego Cnty. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Legal Ethics Op. 2011­2 (2011), available 
at http://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=LEC2011-2 (analyzing California Rule of Professional 
Conduct 2­100, the California equivalent of Model Rule 4.2). 
177. Id. 
178. See id. (requiring attorneys to seek consent from opposing counsel before gaining access to 
a represented party’s social media site).  But see Yvette Ostolaza & Ricardo Pellafone, Applying Model 
Rule 4.2 to Web 2.0: The Problem of Social Networking Sites, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 56, 90–91 (2010) 
(speculating that it might be appropriate for a lawyer to request access to a represented party’s private 
profile without consent from opposing counsel if “the represented party’s act of approving or 
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The San Diego Bar Ethics Committee expressly rejected the notion that 
friending a represented party is the same as accessing an opposing party’s 
publicly viewable website.179  The very reason for making the friend 
request is to overcome the barrier to access that a social media user places 
on his page.180  The prohibition against contact with a party represented 
by counsel is designed to prevent disruption of the trust central to the 
attorney–client relationship.181  The Committee also distinguished this 
situation from those in which some level of permissible subterfuge is 
acceptable.182 
Is an attorney’s friend request a communication “about the subject of 
the representation?”183  Here the Committee looked to the motivation 
behind the request itself.184  If the friend request—which normally makes 
no reference to anything except the sender’s name—is motivated by a 
search for information about the case, then it is about “the subject of the 
representation.”185 
The issue of potential deception or misrepresentation to third parties—
those not represented by counsel—is at the heart of several other ethics 
opinions and at least one lawsuit.  In separate opinions, the Philadelphia 
Bar Association Ethics Committee (March 2009),186 New York City Bar 
Association Committee on Professional Ethics (September 2010),187 and 
the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics 
 
disapproving access to their profile is the conduct that the attorney wishes to observe”). 
179. San Diego Cnty. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Legal Ethics Op. 2011­2 (2011), available at 
http://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=LEC2011-2; accord Michael C. Smith, Social Media Update, 58 
ADVOC. (TEX.), Spring 2012, at 2, 10, available at http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/ 
Advocate_Vol58_Spring_2012.pdf (indicating that the Stored Communications Act may prohibit 
discovery of private information on Facebook). 
180. See San Diego Cnty. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Legal Ethics Op. 2011­2 (2011), available 
at http://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=LEC2011-2 (“It is that restricted access that leads an attorney 
to believe that the information will be less filtered than information a user . . . may post in contexts to 
which access is unlimited.”). 
181. See id. (describing the purpose of the rule as protecting the interests of a person from 
opposing counsel in the matter). 
182. Id.  For example, in a 2011 case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
upheld a prosecutor’s use of fake subpoena attachments to a cooperating witness with whom the 
criminal would be communicating.  United States v. Carona, 660 F.3d 360, 364–65 (9th Cir. 2011). 




186. Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009­02 (2009). 
187. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 
2010­2 (2010). 
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(September 2010)188 held that a lawyer—or someone working under a 
lawyer’s supervision, such as a paralegal—could not friend a witness under 
false pretenses.189  Pointing to both Pennsylvania and New York’s 
prohibition against “knowingly mak[ing] a false statement of material fact 
or law to a third person,”190 as well as their ban on “conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, dec[eption], or misrepresentation,”191 each of the 
committees found that attempting to gain access to someone’s social media 
by friending a witness, or by having a third party friend that witness at the 
lawyer’s behest, would be unethical.192  As the Philadelphia Bar observed, 
failing to tell the witness of the lawyer’s role or his paralegal/investigator’s 
affiliation with the lawyer “omits a highly material fact . . . that the third 
party who [requests] access to the witness’s pages is doing so only because 
he or she is intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer 
for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness.”193  As the 
New York City Bar opinion also noted, the increasing use of social media 
websites by lawyers, and the fact that deception is even easier in the virtual 
world than in person, makes this an issue of heightened concern in the 
digital age.194 
Unfortunately, the scenarios considered by the Philadelphia, New York, 
and San Diego Bar Ethics Committees played out in real life in a pending 
disciplinary proceeding in New Jersey.  Two New Jersey lawyers, John 
Robertelli and Gabriel Adamo, face ethics charges stemming from their 
defense of a personal injury case in 2009.195  The attorneys allegedly 
directed a paralegal, Valentina Cordoba, to friend twenty-year-old plaintiff 
 
188. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 843 (2010). 
189. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 
2010­2 (2010); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 843, at 1, 2 (2010); Phila. Bar 
Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009­2, at 3 (2009).  See generally Mary Pat Gallagher, When 
“Friending” Is Hostile, DAILYREPORTONLINE.COM (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.dailyreportonline. 
com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202570272827&When_friending_is_hostile (discussing the ethics 
opinions by the three bar committees). 
190. PENN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2012); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 
(2009). 
191. PENN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
8.4(c) (2009). 
192. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 
2010­2 (2010); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 843, at 1, 2 (2010); Phila. Bar 
Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009­2, at 3 (2009). 
193. Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009­02, at 3 (2009). 
194. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 
2010­2 (2010). 
195. Complaint at 2, Office of Attorney Ethics v. Adamo, Docket Nos. XIV-2010-0484E & 
XIV-2010-0485E (N.J. Ethics Comm. Nov. 16, 2011). 
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Dennis Hernandez during the litigation “so they could access information 
on his Facebook page that was not available to the public.”196  According 
to the ethics complaint, Robertelli and Adamo’s use of the paralegal’s 
friend request “was a ruse and a subterfuge designed to gain access to non-
public portions of [the] Facebook page for improper use” in defending the 
case.197  The two lawyers denied the charges, claiming they merely 
directed the paralegal to perform general Internet research and “never 
instructed her to ‘friend’” Mr. Hernandez, who was represented by 
counsel.198  Robertelli and Adamo face violations of the following rules of 
the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC):   
RPC 4.2 (communicating with a person represented by counsel); . . . RPC 
5.1 (b) and (c) (failure to supervise a subordinate lawyer); RPC 5.3 (a), (b), 
and (c) (failure to supervise a [nonlawyer] assistant); 8.4 (a) (violation of the 
[RPCs] by inducing another person to do so and violating the [RPCs] 
through the acts of another); 8.4 (c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit[,] and misrepresentation); and RPC 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).199  
Robertelli, who supervised Adamo, is also charged with violating New 
Jersey RPC 5.1(b) and (c), governing the ethical obligations incumbent 
upon “lawyers for the actions of the attorneys they supervise.”200 
Even assuming everything in the light most favorable to the accused 
attorneys, Robertelli and Adamo’s conduct is still troubling from the 
standpoint of the technological competency now expected of attorneys.  
Robertelli, who has no Facebook presence, and Adamo, a self-confessed 
rare user of the social networking site, both claim to be unfamiliar with 
Facebook’s privacy settings and to not know how to distinguish between 
 
196. Mary Pat Gallagher, When “Friending” Is Hostile, DAILYREPORTONLINE.COM (Sept. 6, 
2012), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202570272827&When_friend 
ing_is_hostile; Donald Scarinci, Warning for Lawyers: Facebook Is Not Always Your Friend, 
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL BLOG (Sept. 28, 2012), http://blog.martindale.com/warning-for-lawyers-
facebook-is-not-always-your-friend. 
197. Complaint at 5, Adamo, Docket Nos. XIV-2010-0484E & XIV-2010-0485E. 
198. Mary Pat Gallagher, When “Friending” Is Hostile, DAILYREPORTONLINE.COM (Sept. 6, 
2012), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202570272827&When_friend 
ing_is_hostile. 
199. Complaint at 6, Adamo, Docket Nos. XIV-2010-0484E & XIV-2010-0485E; Mary Pat 
Gallagher, When “Friending” Is Hostile, DAILYREPORTONLINE.COM (Sept. 6, 2012), http: 
//www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202570272827&When_friending_is_hostile. 
200. Mary Pat Gallagher, When “Friending” Is Hostile, DAILYREPORTONLINE.COM (Sept. 6, 
2012), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202570272827&When_friend 
ing_is_hostile; see Complaint at 6 n.1, Adamo, Docket Nos. XIV-2010-0484E & XIV-2010-0485E 
(explaining that the charges under Rule 5.1(b) and (c) are applicable only to Robertelli). 
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public and private content on the site.201  In addition, although they 
knew Hernandez was represented by counsel, both lawyers claim to not 
understand the act of friending someone did in fact constitute a 
communication.202  Such ignorance—assuming it is in fact ignorance—
underscores the ethical dangers lurking for lawyers who are less familiar 
with social media and its nuances. 
At least one case involving an ostensibly routine discovery request for 
social media content raised the troubling issues of waiver of attorney–client 
privilege and possible false friending for one attorney.203  The plaintiff, 
Armstrong, a college student, objected to specific discovery requests from 
the defense for electronic communications with his father, who in his 
capacity as an attorney advised Armstrong on certain privacy issues.204  
Consequently, Armstrong argued his communications with his father were 
privileged.205  The defendant, meanwhile, contended Armstrong’s father 
was a fact witness to the case and that he had attempted to gain access to 
the defendant’s Facebook account “by posing under a fake name.”206  
Fortunately for the plaintiff and his father, the court found there was an 
attorney–client relationship and accordingly sustained Armstrong’s 
objections to the defendant’s discovery requests.207  The court, however, 
did not consider the consequences of the father’s actions;208 if he truly 
acted in the capacity of his son’s counsel and tried to gain access to the 
defendant’s Facebook account under a false name, then potentially 
unethical conduct occurred.209 
 
201. See Mary Pat Gallagher, When “Friending” Is Hostile, DAILYREPORTONLINE.COM (Sept. 
6, 2012), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202570272827&When_ 
friending_is_hostile (noting the attorneys claimed “they thought a friend request was an automatic 
process in which anyone who clicked the button could view another person’s information and did 
not understand that friending someone ‘meant reaching out to specifically request someone to accept 
an invitation’”). 
202. Id. 
203. Armstrong v. Shirvell, No. 2:11-CV-11921, 2012 WL 1656241, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 
10, 2012). 
204. Id. at *2. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at *4–5. 
207. Id. 
208. See id. (failing to consider whether the attempted contact on Facebook was improper in 
his capacity as the plaintiff’s attorney). 
209. Cf. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 
2010­2 (2010) (concluding that “a lawyer may not use deception to access information from a social 
networking webpage”); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 843, at 1 (2010) (positing 
that an attorney will not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct as long as he does not become 
friends with the other party on the social networking website); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance 
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Allegedly improper use of social media has already led to legal action 
against one law firm, its investigator, and its insurance company client.  A 
May 2012 state court lawsuit in Cleveland, Ohio, claims that an Ohio 
insurance defense firm hired an investigator to gain access to the privacy-
restricted Facebook page belonging to a twelve-year-old plaintiff in a dog 
bite lawsuit.210  According to the plaintiff’s complaint, the investigator 
posed as one of the girl’s Facebook friends, enabling him to view her 
private information and access over 1,000 posted messages and 221 photos 
between the minor plaintiff and her friends.211  Recently, this pretexting 
or false friending has resulted in claims of invasion of privacy as well as 
violations of applicable wiretapping statutes for the interception of 
communications.212 
V.     THE DUTY TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE 
Another area rife with ethical risks for lawyers involves the preservation 
of evidence.  Lawyers likely do not want to discover embarrassing photos 
or comments on a client’s Facebook page that can adversely impact the 
case.  At the same time, lawyers cannot instruct their clients to remove the 
offensive content or to delete their Facebook accounts.  Model Rule 3.4 
prohibits a lawyer from unlawfully altering or destroying evidence and 
from assisting others in doing so.213  A lawyer’s ethical duty to preserve 
electronically stored information encompasses social networking profiles. 
In a cautionary tale for the twenty-first century, plaintiff’s counsel in a 
recent Virginia wrongful death case, Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester,214 
directed his paralegal to instruct the client to “clean up” his Facebook 
page.215  The client, the surviving widower of a young woman killed in a 
collision with one of the defendant’s cement trucks, had a Facebook page 
that depicted him drinking and partying in the company of young women, 
including a photo in which he was “holding a beer can while wearing a T-
shirt emblazoned with “I [love] hotmoms,” which made him seem like 
 
Comm., Op. 2009­02, at 2, 4 (2009) (indicating that intentional deception by stealthily friending 
the other party is not acceptable even if accessed through a third party). 
210. Complaint at 3, Cope v. Prince, No. CV 12-781824 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 2, 2012). 
211. Id. at 4–5. 
212. Id. at 5–6; see, e.g., Michael C. Smith, Social Networking Update, 58 ADVOC. (TEX.), 
Spring 2012, at 2, 10, available at http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/Advocate_Vol58_ 
Spring_2012.pdf (describing the Stored Communications Act prohibition of discovery of private 
information on Facebook). 
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2012). 
214. Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 736 S.E.2d 699 (Va. 2013). 
215. Id. at 702. 
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anything but a grieving husband.216  During discovery, plaintiff’s counsel 
represented to the defense attorneys that his client did not have a Facebook 
account.217  After a substantial verdict for the plaintiff, the defense lawyers 
sought a new trial based on spoliation of evidence.218  The court assessed 
sanctions of $722,000 against the client and his lawyer, Matthew 
Murray—$542,000 against Murray and $180,000 against his client—for 
their “extensive pattern of deceptive and obstructionist conduct.”219  
Courts are increasingly receptive to sanctions when it comes to the deletion 
of electronic evidence.220 
VI.     ETHICAL CONDUCT INVOLVING JURORS 
Lawyers increasingly use social media platforms to screen jurors prior to 
jury selection.  In an age in which many trials are derailed or verdicts 
overturned by the online misconduct of jurors, more and more lawyers are 
monitoring jurors online.221  At least one court has explicitly upheld the 
practice of using the Internet to investigate potential jurors during voir 
dire.  In Carino v. Muenzen,222 a New Jersey appellate court refused to 
grant a new trial for a medical malpractice plaintiff after a trial judge 
prevented his lawyer from conducting online research on the venire panel, 
but specifically “found that the trial judge should have allowed [plaintiff]’s 
counsel to utilize his computer during jury selection.”223 
But what about the ethical issues involved in monitoring the social 
networking activities of jurors and prospective jurors?  To date, only two 
ethics opinions have addressed this question: 
 
In New York County Lawyers’ Association [(NYCLA)] Committee on 
 
216. Id. at 702–03. 
217. Id. at 702. 
218. Id. at 701–02. 
219. Id. at 703; see Lester v. Allied Concrete Co., Nos. CL08-150, CL09-223, 2011 WL 
9688369 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 2011) (recounting the trial court’s findings after further hearings). 
220. See Christou v. Beatport, L.L.C., No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KMT, 2013 WL 248058, at *14 
(D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2013) (ordering sanctions for failure to preserve “text messages as potential 
evidence”). 
221. See John G. Browning & Carol Kreiling, From Voir Dire to “Voir Google”: Using Social 
Media in Jury Selection and Jury Monitoring, LITIG. MGMT., Summer 2012, at 43 (emphasizing the 
increasing use by lawyers of the Internet to vet jurors); Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, 
Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 7–8 (2012) 
(“Indeed, for better or worse, lawyers are frequently using social media to discover information about 
potential jurors, opposing counsel, and (less frequently) the judge herself.” (citations omitted)). 
222. Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 
30, 2010). 
223. Id. at *12. 
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Professional Ethics Formal Opinion 743 (May 18, 2011), the Committee 
held that “passive monitoring of jurors, such as viewing a publicly available 
blog or Facebook page” is permissible so long as lawyers have no direct or 
indirect contact with jurors during trial.  Significantly, the NYCLA 
cautioned lawyers to “not act in any way by which the juror becomes aware 
of the monitoring.”  The Committee, perhaps cognizant of the fact that sites 
like Twitter and LinkedIn allow users to view who has recently accessed their 
profile, reminded attorneys that access that a juror becomes aware of may 
very well constitute “an impermissible communication, as it might tend to 
influence the juror’s conduct with respect to the trial.”  In addition, the 
Committee took note of the prevalence of online misconduct by jurors.  It 
concluded that if, during monitoring of jurors’ social networking sites, a 
lawyer learns of juror misconduct, “the lawyer may not unilaterally act upon 
such knowledge to benefit the lawyer’s client, but must . . . bring such 
misconduct to the attention of the court, before engaging in any further 
significant activity in the case.”224 
 
The second opinion from the New York City Bar Association’s 
Professional Ethics Committee agreed with the 2011 opinion from the 
New York County Lawyers Association, but also addressed the broader 
issue of what exactly constitutes an impermissible ex parte communication 
with a juror.225  The Committee ruled that “communication” should be 
understood in its broadest sense.226  This would include “not only 
sending a specific message but also any notification to the person being 
researched that he or she has been the subject of a lawyer’s research 
efforts.”227  The paramount issue, in the eyes of the Committee, is that 
the juror or potential juror must not learn of the attorney’s actions.228  As 
the opinion states, “[T]he central question an attorney must answer before 
engaging in jury research . . . using a particular service is whether her 
actions will cause the juror to learn of the research.”229  The Committee 
further stated: 
 
[I]f a juror were to (i) receive a “friend” request (or similar invitation to share 
information on a social network site) as a result of an attorney’s research, or 
(ii) otherwise to learn of the attorney’s viewing or attempted viewing of the 
 
224. John G. Browning & Carol Kreiling, From Voir Dire to “Voir Google”: Using Social Media 
in Jury Selection and Jury Monitoring, LITIG. MGMT., Summer 2012, at 43, 46. 
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juror’s pages, posts, or comments that would constitute a prohibited 
communication if the attorney was aware that her actions would cause the 
juror to receive such message or notification.  We [the Committee] further 
conclude that the same attempts to research the juror might constitute a 
prohibited communication even if inadvertent or unintended.230 
 
In other words, ignorance or lack of familiarity will not be an excuse in 
committing such an ethical violation.231  This position is consistent with 
the trend in cases around the country, along with the new requirement of 
being technologically conversant as part of providing competent 
representation, by holding attorneys to a higher standard insofar as 
technology is concerned. 
Of course, there are ways to avoid making jurors aware that they are 
being followed on the Internet.  Take Twitter for example: one company, 
X1 Social Discovery, offers a specialized public follow feature that enables 
access to all the past tweets of a specific user (up to 3,200 past tweets) and 
any new tweets in real-time without generating a formal follow request 
that results in a notification to the juror being followed.232  As for a 
juror’s privacy concerns, one must keep in mind that virtually all social 
networking sites remind their users of the public nature of what they are 
sharing.  It is stated in Twitter’s terms of service: “What you say on 
Twitter may be viewed all around the world instantly.  You are what you 
Tweet!”233 
The concept of attorneys performing online investigations and 
monitoring jurors’ social media activities is not uniformly endorsed.  One 
federal court concluded there is no recognized right for an attorney to 
monitor a juror’s use of social media and opined that such efforts by 
lawyers could both intrude on the “safety, privacy, and protection against 
harassment” to which jurors are entitled and potentially stifle juror 
willingness to participate in the democratic system of justice.234 
The earlier discussion of Johnson illustrated how lawyers increasingly are 
held to a higher professional standard insofar as the use of technology in 
juror selection is concerned.235  A recent case from the Kentucky Supreme 
 
230. Id. 
231. See id. (providing guidance to attorneys who engage in jury research using social media). 
232. X1 Social Discovery Product Feature: Twitter Public Follow, X1DISCOVERY.COM, 
http://x1discovery.com/video_public_follow.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
233. Terms of Service, TWITTER (June 25, 2012), https://twitter.com/tos. 
234. United States v. Kilpatrick, No. 10-CR-20403, 2012 WL 3237147, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 7, 2012) (citation omitted). 
235. See Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 558–59 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (concluding 
that because of the advances in technology, parties will carry the greater burden of uncovering 
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Court, Sluss v. Commonwealth,236 reveals the potential dangers lurking in 
this area for the unwary.237  In this case, appellant Ross Sluss was 
convicted of murder and driving under the influence of intoxicants after 
crashing his pickup truck into another vehicle with several passengers.238  
As a result of the crash, an eleven-year-old passenger in the other vehicle 
was killed.239  The tragedy and ensuing criminal case garnered 
tremendous publicity, including extensive online discussion on Facebook 
and other social media sites.  The trial court, sensitive to the amount of 
attention the case received before trial began, engaged in extensive voir dire 
procedures.240 
After his conviction, Sluss sought a new trial based on juror misconduct, 
claiming two of the jurors, one being the jury foreperson, were Facebook 
friends with the victim’s mother.241  During voir dire, both jurors 
remained silent when asked if they knew the victim or any member of the 
victim’s family.242  Moreover, during individual voir dire, one of the 
accused jurors replied unequivocally that she did not have a Facebook 
account; the other juror acknowledged having a Facebook presence and 
being vaguely aware that something had been set up in the victim’s name, 
although she did not share anything beyond that.243 
The court analyzed the nature of the Facebook friend status and 
ultimately held this fact alone would be insufficient grounds for a new 
trial.244  However, it was more troubled by the jurors’ misstatements 
during voir dire, especially because it was unknown “to what extent the 
victim’s mother and the jurors had actually communicated, or the scope of 
any actual relationship they may have had.”245  It acknowledged this was 
“the first time that [it was] asked to address [the issue of] counsel’s 
investigation of jurors [through the] use of social media” and turned to 
whether the defense counsel should have discovered the online evidence of 
 
information at an earlier point in litigation regarding the potential jurors’ litigation history). 
236. Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215 (Ky. 2012). 
237. See id. at 222 (discussing, in the context of disqualifying juror question and answers 
during voir dire, the difference between friendships and Facebook friendships and finding that merely 
indicating a friendship status on Facebook does not necessarily indicate a true friendship). 
238. Id. at 218–19. 
239. Id. at 218. 
240. Id. at 221. 
241. Id. at 220–21. 
242. Id. at 221. 
243. Id. at 222. 
244. Id. at 222–23. 
245. Id. at 224. 
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juror misconduct prior to the verdict.246  The court ultimately held the 
juror misconduct did warrant, at a minimum, a hearing to determine the 
nature and extent of the Facebook conduct, or alternatively a new trial.247  
Additionally, it excused the attorney’s failure to discover the misconduct 
earlier because the jurors’ answers during voir dire had given him “little 
reason . . . to think he needed to investigate a juror’s Facebook account or 
that he even could have done so ethically given the state of the law at the 
time of trial.”248  The court, however, extensively discussed the ethical 
parameters surrounding counsel’s investigation of jurors on social media 
sites, referencing with approval the position advocated by the New York 
County Bar Association Ethics Committee.249  Although conceding that 
“the practice of conducting intensive [I]nternet vetting of potential jurors 
is becoming more commonplace,” the court made no decision whether 
there should be an affirmative duty for attorneys to perform such 
searches.250  It observed that while much of the information being sought 
is likely public, “a reasonable attorney without guidance may not think this 
investigatory tactic appropriate, and it is still such a new line of inquiry 
that many attorneys who themselves are not yet savvy about social media 
may never even have thought of such inquiry.”251 
In light of the Ethics 20/20 Commission’s recommendations and 
subsequent changes to the Model Rules, local rules holding lawyers to a 
standard of greater technological proficiency, and the use of social media 
platforms becoming more widespread among attorneys, it may eventually 
not be enough to get by without Facebook-ing the jury. 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
The use of social networking in actual practice is both a necessary 
weapon in a lawyer’s arsenal and a potential ethical minefield.  Attorneys 
run the risk of breaching the duty to provide competent representation if 
they ignore all-pervasive social networking platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter and the utility they offer.  Yet, at the same time, the misuse of 
social media in managing client communications, case investigation and 
fact-gathering, preserving evidence, and the selection and monitoring of 
jurors presents serious ethical issues.  Attorneys would do well to heed 
 
246. Id. at 226. 
247. Id. at 229–30. 
248. Id. at 226. 
249. Id. at 227. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
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some of the same advice they dispense to clients: treat social media as 
simply another form of communication, subject to the same ethical 
constraints as the more traditional modes, and adopt a social media policy 
that will guide both lawyers and non-lawyer employees in the responsible 
use of social networking.  In the digital age, sticking one’s head in the 
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